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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.T. \YENDELL l\IARRIOT, Admin-

istrator of the Estate of RUSSELL L.
Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
11879

SKYLINE CONSTRUCTION
CO)IP AN"Y, INC., a corporation, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

Brief of Defendants-Respondents

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by the administrator of a deceased
workman to recover life insurance and accidental death
benefits claimed to be due under a group insurance
program.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOlVER COURT
This action was originally filed in the District
Court of Cache County, but upon motion of defendants
for a change of venue was transferred to the District
Court of Salt Lake County. Approximately three and
one-half years after the complaint was filed, defendant
Skyline Construction Company moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to prosecute or in the alternative
for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, both plaintiff and the other defendants moved for summary judgment. Upon the hearing of such motions, defendant
Skyline Construction Company's motion for summary
judgment was granted and the other motions were taken
under advisement, the parties being requested to file
memorandums in support of their motions. After submission of such memorandums, the motion of the other
defendants for summary judgment was granted and
the motion of plaintiff was denied. Thereafter, plaintiff filed what was denominated "motion to vacate
judgment and to enter conforming judgment," which,
after hearing, was denied. The notice of appeal was
filed one month after the denial of the latter motion
but several months after the entry of the order granting
the summary judgment in favor of the other defendants
(respondents herein). No appeal has been taken from
the order granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant Skyline Construction Company.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
L cspondents seek affirmance of the summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this action are relatively simple and
are not in dispute as to any material matter, if at all.
Plaintiff's intestate, Russell L. Marriot, became employed as an operating engineer by Skyline Constructio11 Company on August 1, 1964. He worked as such
for 198 hours in August and 104 hours in September,
1Ufi4 ( R. 49-54). On September 17, 1964, he was killed
when the crane he was operating came in contact with
a high voltage line ( R. 50) .
lly an agreement dated June 1, 1956, between the
Operating Engineer's Local Union #3 of the Interua lional Union of Opera ting Engineers and various
employers in the construction industry the "Operating
Engineer's Trust Fund for Utah" was created (R. 7888) . Pursuant to such agreement, the trustees thereof
initiated a group insurance program, under which defendant Pacific National Life Insurance Company was
insurer for the life insurance benefits and defendant
Continental Casualty Company was insurer for the
other benefits provided under the program (R. 91).
The premiums were paid by the various employers
(under a collective bargaining agreement with the
union) based upon the number of hours worked by
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eligible employees during the preceding month ( R.
53-54).

As an employee became insured for group
under the program, a booklet describing the insuring
agreements was issued to him and a "Certificate of
Coverage" was affixed to the booklet (R. 91). The
Certificate-Booklet contains the following language
(R. 91, p. 3):
"The insurance benefits and all of the provisions applicable to the persons insured are described in this booklet and are effective only if
the person is eligible for the insurance, becomes
insured and remains insured in accordance with
the provisions of the policies. 'Vhen the Certificate of Coverage is issued as evidence of the insurance provided and is affixed as provided
above, this booklet becomes the individual's Certificate-Booklet." (Emphasis added).
The Certificate-Booklet, as well as the master policies (R. 75) contains the following provision (R. 91,
p. 5):
"The initial eligibility requirements of the plan
provide that an employee must work for one or
more contributing employers at least 300 hours
in a period of three or less consecutive calendar
months. Each employee who meets this requirement (herein referred to as a member) shall first
become insured on the first of the second calendar
month next following such period." (Emphasis
added.)
Under a section entitled "When Insurance Becomes Effective" the Certificate-Booklet continues (R.
91, p. 6):
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"Employees: Your insurance under this Plan
becomes effective on the date you are eligible ac.. ordi1.!g to the rules described on the previous
page.
"Qualification. If you are not in active regular
employment, on account of injury or sickness,
on the date your insurance would become effective as indicated above, your insurance will become effective on the date you return to fulltime work or a n1ila bility for work; except that if
you become disabled while actively at work between the date on which you complete the necessary hours for eligibility and the date your eligibility actually begins, your insurance will take
effect as indicated above."
\\'bile nut necessary to support the trial court's
judgment, it should be noted that at the time of his
death, )Ir. )larriot was not a member of the Operating
J•:ugiuccr's Union as he had failed to pay all of the
iuitiation fee and his application was forfeited (R. 40) .
.After
)larriot's death, claim was made for
of a $2,000.00 life insurance benefit and a
accidental death benefit. The claim was denied hy the trustees upon the basis that Mr. l\Iarriot
had never become insured under the program.
ARGUMENT
UNDER THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOl'S TEIL\IS OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT, :\IR :\IARRIOT HAD NOT BECOME
IXSCRED AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH

5

AND \VAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BEN.K
FITS CLAIMED.
There is no dispute between the parties over th.:
fact that Mr. Marriot did not complete 300 hours as
an operating engineer for a contributing employe1
until the middle of September, 1964. Thus, he would
not have become insured until November 1, 1964, and
was not covered on September 17, 1964, the date of
his death. It is a fundamental principle of insurance
law that when parties to an insurance contract have
made an agreement as to when the coverage is to become
effective, such agreement, in the absence of uncertainty
or ambiguity, is controlling. The principle is stated
in Couch on Insurance, 2d §39 :54, page 467, as follows:
"The parties to a contract of insurance may
agree as to when and under what circumstances
and conditions the contract shall go into effect,
and unless there is uncertainty or ambiguity, the
insurance contract speaks for itself as to its effective date.
"The effective date of the contract of insurance
may be specified in the policy as the date of issuance or a date prior or subsequent thereto, or
before or after delivery. In the absence of statutory prohibition the policy may become effective
at once or prior to issuance thereof, or in futuro.
"Since the insurance contract, as in the case
of any other contract, is to be interpreted to give
effect to the agreement of the parties, it follows
that the time which they have specified in the
policy as the effective date thereof is binding
upon them."
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This court has applied that principle on several
uccasions. For example, in Jones v. New Yark Life In• 1: rr1 n ce ('1,mpanu, 69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200 (1927),
it said:
"It was within the rights of, and was competent for, the parties to provide in the application
under what conditions and at what time the policy
should become effective and binding. Sterling v.
Lodge, 28 Utah 505, 80 Pac. 375; \Vhite v.
:\Ietropolitan Life Insurance Co., 63 Utah 272,
224 Pac. 1106. It is not, however, as we understand appellant's argument, seriously contended
that these provisions are not binding upon the
insured."
Rejecting an argument that there had been a waiver
Ly the insurer, of the provisions as to when the contract

.1hould go into effect, the court continued:
"'Ve are not here dealing with the claim of
waiver of the terms of an existing contract. The
controlling question is, rather, whether there
was in fact a contract in effect at the date of
death of the insured. The conditions specifically
stipulated in the application are that no contract of insurance should come into existence
until the policy was delivered to the insured and
the first premium paid, and, further, that the
insured had not prior to delivery of the policy
consulted a physician.

*

*

*

"The district court's order protects the respondent company in the rights reserved to it in
the application by the insured, and does not deny
to appellant any relief that she can rightfully
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claim under the wording of the application and
the proven facts in this case."
More recently, the United States Court of
for the Tenth Circuit, applying Utah law, came to a
similar conclusion. M of rad v. New York Life ln.Yurance
Company, 206 F.2d 491 (1953). It was held that the
insurance policy had not become effective, although the
first monthly premium had been paid and the application was written to take effect as of its date, when specified conditions had not occurred prior to the applicant's
death. The court stated:
"But, 'A contract of insurance rests upon and
is controlled by the same principles of law applicable to any other contract. What the contracting parties intended, mutually agreed to
and their minds met upon, is the measure of their
obligations (citing cases) . And if the intentions
of the parties are clear from an examination of
the contractual documents, this court will not
rewrite the contract.

*

*

*

*

"The application for the policy provided that
the insurance policy should be dated as of the
date of the application.' It with within the rights
of, and was competent for, the parties to provide
in the application under what conditions and at
what time the policy should become effective and
binding. Jones v. New Lork Life Insurance
Comnany, 1927, 69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200,
202.'t
Even where a policy has been issued, the parties
to the contract may agree that the insurance will not
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lake dl LCi: until ihe fulfillment of certain con<litiuu;,.
ul'i1

.lll
ti11

agreement is binding upon the parties.
lnsuranee, :Zcl s:JU:9li p. 500, it is stated:

111

"The parties may agree to delay the effeetiYe
date of the
by providing that it must be
in force for a specified period, such a'.> one month,
IJefore the risk attaches. So, a life insurance
policy may provide that there shall be no liability
unless the insure<l lives a specified length of time
after issuance of the policy. Similarly, it may
be expressly proYided in life, health, and accident insurance policies that no liability shall
attach in eertain cases unless the cause of the disability upon whieh the elaim for reco\·ery is based
sltall arise after the policy has been in force for
a speeifiecl length of time."
Il

further stated hy Couch that a loss sustained duri11µ; the delay perio<l specified in the policy is not covered
page 500):
( Coud1 on lnsur:mce, :Zd
"\ Vhere a life insurance policy must have been
issued and in existence for a year before the risk
attaches, there is no recovery for the death oi
the insured within that year. A policy which is
not to be effective until June I does not cover
disability during
although the application
shows no disability in April when the insured
was eligible for insurance without evidence of
insura bility. And where, in order to recover disability bc1;efits, the policy must have been in
force for one year prior to the accident, disability
for an aceident which occurred prior to midnight
of the last <late of the policy year is not covered."
The fact that the contract is under a group policy
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and evidenced by a Certificate-Booklet rather than a
policy does not alter this principle. As stated in Couch
on Insurance, 2d §82 :2:
"In order to constitute effective group insurance as to a particular employee, it is, of course,
necessary to find the existence of all the elements
essential to any contract of insurance."

A group insurance plan always establishes certain
requirements of criteria for participation and the courts
have consistently held that anyone not satisfying such
requirements or criteria is not eligible for participation
and is not covered in the event of loss. For example, in
Wi/,son v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App.
330, 151 S.E.2d 550, it was held that an employee was not eligible under a group hospital and
surgical policy in view of the requirement that an employee must work a minimum number of hours during
an eligibility quarter of three months in order to be
eligible for insurance for the subsequent insurance
quarter of three months. The employee had not worked
the required number of hours.
In Burns v. AGC and Local 701, 240 Ore. 95, 400
P.2d 2, a group insurance contract required a workman to maintain a reserve of not less than 100 hours,
and provided that when the reserve dropped below 100
hours there was no insurance for the next succeeding
month, unless the workman elected to keep it in force
by cash payment. It was held that since the deceased
workman's reserves had dropped below 100 hours, under
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the contract the trustees were entitled to treat the
account a:: inactive. Thus, life insurance was not in
t'o1 ce at the time the workman was killed and his widow
could not recover thereon.
The court in that case remarked:
"The insurance was never bargained for between the insurer and the workman, so there is
no need to consider whether the agreement was,
or could have been, misleading to a given workman. Apparently the contract was not misleading to the trustees, who acted on the workman's
behalf. The trustees take the same position in
this litigation that the insurer takes. \Vhile we
have no quarrel with the plaintiff's citation of
authorities which hold that ambiguities in an insurance agreement will be liberally construed
in farnr of the insured, these authorities are beside the point in the case before us."

In Smith v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 555, 267 N.Y.S. 579, it
was held that a group life insurance policy which provided that it would become effective as to any employee
in active service on any day when he performed on a
full-time basis at his employer's regular place of employment the regular duties of his occupation or employment, never became effective as to an employee who
was confined in a hospital throughout the relevant
period.

The insuring agreement in the present case clearly
provides that an employee shall "first become insured"
on the first day of the second calendar month following
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a consecutiYe period of three months or less in wl1id1
he had worked at least ;300 hours.
had
not worked the 300 hours until shortly before his dca th.
IIe had never become insured under the progLtm and
Lad no benefits due him from the defc11clants.
In his brief plaintiff argues that there was a waiYer
by the defendants as to the effectiYc date of insma11ce.
He "finds-' this waiver in an additional proYision of
the Certificate-Booklet (H. 9, p. o).
"If you are not in active regular employment
on account of i11j ury or sickness on the cla te your
insurance would have become effectiYe as indicated above, your insurance will become etfecti,-c
on the date vou return to full-time work or
ability for
except that if >·ou become disabled while actiYelv at work between the date
on which you complete the necessar>· hours for
eligibility and the date your eligibility actually
begins, your insurance will take effect as irnlica,ted above."
How such language could co11stitute a waivei· of
the earlier provision is difficult tu understaud. All it
does is postpone the effective date of the coyerage if
the employee is not in regular employment because of
injury or sickness on the date it would otherwise become
effective, except where the employee's disability is sustained on the job. In the latter case, the insurance
effect the same day as if the employee had continued
working. It is true, that in the present case if :\Ir .
.Marriot had sun-ived until after Nov. I, and then suecumbed from the injuries he "·mild probably have
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been entitled to the life insurance benefits. \Vhile
appear that such result is anomolous or
111equitable, nonetheless it is compelled by the explicit
agreement of the parties. Moreover, it must be recognized that in group contracts particularly, there must
be some standard provision controlling the effective
elate of the coverage as to each employee. \Vhen the
effeetive date is clearly and expressly set forth it cannot
be altered merely because the result, as to one employee,
may seem to be inequitable. Under the construction
contended for by plaintiff, the language "each employee who meets this requirement * * * shall first become insured on the first day of the second calendar
month next following such period" would have to have
been omitted, but it was not and it must be given its
ordinary meaning.
it may

Plaintiff, in this connection, attempts to invoke the
rule set forth in Section 302 of the Restatement of
Contracts. That rule, however, is not applicable to the
circumstances of the present case as is amply shown
by the illustrations thereunder.
Plaintiff's additional argument that there should
have been a fifth basis for termination of insurance
does not appear persuasive. \Ve are not dealing with
termination, as the insurance had never gone into effect
as to .Mr. Marriot.
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II

THE LANGUAGE OF THE lXSLlL\.:\'CJ·,
CONTRACT AS TO ITS EFFECT!\' E DATE
OF COVERAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE, lS :\f OT
AMBIGUOUS AND THERE IS NO BASIS
FOR IT TO BE CONSTRUED AGAIN ST THE
INSURERS.
Defendants have no quarrel with plaintiffs argument that ambiguities in an insurance contract will
generally be construed in favor of the insured. HowcYcr,
the principle has no application in the present case.
The language of the contract, construed in any reasonable manner, is not ambiguous. Plaintiff's only cm1tention concerning ambiguity relates to whether the
term "disabled" as used in the section on qualification
(R. 91, p. 6) could be construed to include death. But
it is quite universally held that the term "disability"
or "disabled" in an insurance contract does not include
death. As stated in Couch on Insurance, 2d S53.4,
page 25:
"'Vhile in a practical sense death is the most
disabling of all disabilities, it is clear that for
the purpose of an insurance policy 'disability'
and its numerous variant phrases are used in the
sense which requires the coutinuancc of an insured's life. Conversely, death is confined to the
life insurance aspect of the contract and is not
regarded as coming within the disability con'rage. Thus it is generally held that no liability
for death arises under a policy prcn-iding for
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indemnity to the insured in case of permanent
cir total disability.
"Neither is death a 'disability' within the meaning of a policy providing for weekly indemnity
in the case of accidental injury of an insured
resulting in total disability to transact a business
of his occupation." (Emphasis added).
In 44 Am. J ur. 2d Insurance, §1595, it is said:
"From the very nature of the insurance inrnlved, it is clear and it is generally held that
no liability for death arises under a policy proYision for indemnity to the insured in case of
permanent or total disability."
:.l\IoreoYer, to hold that the word "disabled" in the
section under qualification includes "death" would
create a highly anomalous and unintended result. Under
the insurance contract, the parties have agreed that Mr.
Marriot (and all other members) would not become
insured and entitled to life insurance and accidental
death benefits until the first day of the second month
following completion of 300 hours work. He had no
insurance for death until after that date. To argue
that if he died before that date he could nevertheless
be covered for such benefits results in an obvious non
sequiter. The proYision under "qualification" is clear
and unambiguous. All that it does is postpone coverage
where the employee is not in active regular employment
because of injury or sickness except when he is injured
on the job. EYen if Mr. Marriot had only been disabled, he would not have had any insurance benefits
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to cover the disability except those that occurred after
November 1, 1964.
Plaintiff states that the language should be giYeu
a rational and practical construction. Defendants agrc::e
but submit that the only rational and practical construction is the one stated above.
the insurance was not purchased or bargained for by .Mr . .Marriot. It was obtained by the trustees who take the same
position as the insurers. Thus, the argument that .:\Ir.
Marriot should be given the insurance he thought he
was purchasing does not apply. See Burns v. AGC wul
Local 701, supra.
Plaintiff argues that it would be contrary to public
policy to "void the insurance under the terms of the
coverage which they had written." This, however, m·erlooks the fact that there had been no insurance for Mr.
Marriot to void. There was merely an agreement that
the insurance would take effect on a date which had
not arrived when Mr. Marriot lost his life. Such a provision is absolutely necessary in a group insurance policy
where participants are being added and dropped at
intervals as they become eligible for the insurance. As
shown under Point I above, the courts give effect to
such provisions and there is nothing contrary to public
policy about them. Certainly there is nothing unreasonable about the provision. Plaintiff's argument as to
what the result might have been had Mr.
been
fired and entitled to conversion privileges has no bearing
upon what actually happened in the present case. Cer-
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tainly the results might have been different if other
'.hir..gs had happened but they didn't. His statement
that to find against .Mr. Marriot would make it impossible for a person who was killed on the job to avoid
forfeiture of all his rights is just not correct. Had he
been killed after his coverage went into effect there is
no doubt that he would have been covered, but he cannot
be covered under a policy which had not gone into
effect.
Plaintiff, citing 1lletropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Evans, 189 S.E. 369 (Ga., 1936), argues that
at most the effective date (of November 1, 1964) should
set the date when the benefits could be collected even
though the event happened prior to that time. In the
Evans case, it was held that even though the accident
happened prior to the expiration of one year, total and
permanent disability may not have arisen until after
the policy had been in effect for one year, since total
disability is a question of fact. Here, however, we are
dealing with death. There is absolutely no question
that this occurred prior to the effective date of the
insurance. Other cases cited by plaintiff clearly are not
in point, nor are the sections of the insurance code cited
by him (§31-23-15, 16, 17).
Also, plaintiff complains of the matter being decided by summary judgment, and states that there
should be "the usual prerogative of either party to request a trial by jury. In the present case plaintiff as
well as the defendants moved for summary judgment.
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There was clearly no dispute as to any material fact.
The question decided is one of law. Summary judgment was entirely proper and under the circumstances
could only have been granted in favor of defendants.

CONCLUSION
The insurance contract obtained by the union for
the benefit of its employees clearly and unambiguously
provides that the insurance does not become effectin
as to a particular employee until the first day of the
second month after the employee has become eligible.
To become eligible an employee must work 300 hours
in three or less consecutive months for a contributing
employer. The evidence is undisputed that l\Ir ..
had not become eligible until the middle of September,
shortly before he died. The insurance would not have
become effective until November l, 1964!, and there
was no life inurance or accidental death coverage at
the time of his death. There are no ambiguities in any
pertinent provision of the insurance contract to be construed against the insurers and no waiver by them of
the provisions as to the effective death of coverage.
Although one can sympathize with l\Ir. l\Iarriot's
heirs, the language of the contract is binding and must
be given effect to uphold summary judgment in favor
of defendants.
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Respectfully submitted,
P. KNUTE PETERSON
East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

320

Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents
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